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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough"
The survey period' produced sixty-one appellate decisions. Of that
group, fourteen are digested here. The cases included clearly focus on
issues of children. Moreover, the Georgia General Assembly tightenedup the child support guidelines and added new teeth for enforcement of
support orders. Finally, new legislation prohibiting same sex and
common law marriages was enacted.
I. CHILD CUSTODY
In Baldwin v. Baldwin,2 the juvenile court found both parents fit and
equally capable of caring for the child. Notwithstanding that finding,
the court awarded custody to the mother.' The Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court must consider joint custody
where it finds the parents fit and equally capable of caretaking.4 On
remand, the juvenile court awarded joint legal and physical custody.
Although the juvenile court concluded that joint custody was not feasible
nor in the child's best interest, it construed the court of appeals opinion
to mandate that result.5 The court of appeals denied the father's
application to appeal the joint custody order and the supreme court
granted certiorari from that denial.6
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed:

* Partner in the firm of McGough & Kuckleburg, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. This survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law occuring
between June 1, 1995, and May 31, 1996.
2. 265 Ga. 465, 458 S.E.2d 126 (1995).

3. Id. at 465, 458 S.E.2d at 127.
4. In re A.R.B., 209 Ga. App. 324, 327, 433 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1993).
5. Baldwin, 265 Ga. at 465, 458 S.E.2d at 127.

6. Id.
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We hold that where, as here, the trial court determines that both
parties are fit and equally capable of caring for the child, the court
must consider joint custody but is not required to enter such an order
unless it specifically finds that to do so would be in the best interest of
the child.'
In remanding the custody issue to the juvenile court for reconsideration, the supreme court noted that state legislative policy favors shared
rights and responsibilities between the parents.8 However, the trial
courts still have the "primary duty in any custody determination
between parents" to decide the best interest of the child and what will
promote the child's welfare and happiness."
0
The Baldwin"
rule was followed in Graham v. Holmes," a custody
and visitation modification action. In Graham the parties by practice
over a period of years had substantially increased the mother's visitation
with the child. Upon the father's remarriage, the mother's access to the
child was restricted. The trial court found the parents equally capable
of caring for the child but found no material change in condition which
warranted a change of custody." The court did increase visitation, but
the expanded visitation was less than the parties had practiced before
the father remarried."
Surprisingly, the court of appeals stated:
"Despite the trial court's finding, there indisputably has been a
substantial change in conditions insofar as the mother's relationship
with the child is concerned, in that a stepmother has entered the child's
14
life."
Observing that expert opinion was at odds on whether to award joint
custody or to change custody, and that the mother had not sought joint
custody, the court of appeals held that the trial court had not abused its
discretion.'" The voluntary variation from the visitation awarded by
the divorce court "does not ripen automatically into a change of conditions." 6

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-3(a) (1990) & 19-9-6 (1991)).
Id.
Id.

11. 218 Ga. App. 796, 463 S.E.2d 513 (1995).

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 798-99, 463 S.E.2d at 515.
at 799, 463 S.E.2d at 515.
at 798, 463 S.E.2d at 515.
at 799, 463 S.E.2d at 516.
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In Wrightson v. Wrightson, 7 the Georgia Supreme Court struck down
a portion of a custody decree that provided visitation would be suspended or modified upon certain determinations by a mental health
professional. The court held "the expert's opinion may serve as evidence
supporting the trial court's decision to modify or suspend visitation," but
"the decision must be made by the trial court, not the expert.""8
II. CHILD SUPPORT
In addition to cases concerning child custody, several cases dealing
with child support were also decided during the survey period. For
example, in Barnes v. Justis,9 the court of appeals held that child
support payments due on the first day of the month are to be prorated
in the month the child reaches the age of majority.20
In Wright v. Newman," the supreme court used the contract doctrine
of promissory estoppel to impose a child support obligation on a man
who was neither the biological nor adoptive father of the child in a case
to which the theory of virtual adoption did not apply. The trial court
found that Wright promised Newman and the child "that he would
assume all of the obligations and responsibilities of fatherhood, including
that of providing support." 2 That promise was evidenced "by Wright
listing himself as the father on the child's birth certificate and giving the
child his last name,"' even though at that time he knew he was not
the natural father of the child. He supported the child for ten years and
held himself out to others as the father. Moreover, the mother and the
child relied on Wright's promise to their detriment by not pursuing the
biological father. On these facts the supreme court found it would be
unjust to permit Wright to evade the consequence of his promise.24
III. ENFORCEMENT
In Dyer v.
the Georgia Supreme Court held that a Georgia
court which divorced the parties had subject matter jurisdiction to hear
Surratt,2 5

17.

266 Ga. 493, 467 S.E.2d 578 (1996).

18. Id. at 496, 467 S.E.2d at 581.
19. 219 Ga. App. 815, 467 S.E.2d 3 (1996).
20. Id. at 816, 467 S.E.2d at 4.

21.
22.
23.
24.

266 Ga. 519, 467 S.E.2d 533 (1996).
Id. at 520, 467 S.E.2d at 535.
Id.
Id. at 521, 467 S.E.2d at 535. The dissent per Benham, C.J., notes that Wright and

Newman severed their relationship when the child was three, and for the next five years,,
Wright did not see the child. Id. at 523, 467 S.E.2d at 537.
25. 266 Ga. 220, 466 S.E.2d 584 (1996).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

318

[Vol. 48

a contempt action brought by the resident noncustodian against the
nonresident custodian when the divorce judgment had not been modified
by a foregoing court. However, personal service outside Georgia on the
nonresident did not confer in personam jurisdiction on the Georgia
court.2 6

The supreme court ruled that the Uniform Child Custody

Jurisdiction Act "does not provide the exclusive means by which a party
may seek enforcement of the custody provisions of a Georgia judgment."27
In another enforcement case, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
a trial court cannot direct payment of attorney fees by a party found in
contempt of a prior order and simultaneously condition avoidance of, or
release from, incarceration upon satisfaction of the award.28
In Williams v.Stepler,29 the Georgia Court of Appeals enforced a
provision of the Uniform Superior Court Rules, ("U.S.C.R."), holding
that, upon request of a party, the in-chambers interview of a child by the
trial court must be recorded when custody is involved.80 The court
rejected the argument that a family violence proceeding 3' is not a
domestic relations action within the meaning of U.S.C.R. 24.32
The juvenile court in In re R.E.W 3 refused the father unsupervised
visitation and holiday or summer visitation, finding that he was engaged
in an "immoral" homosexual relationship and could not be trusted to
keep the nature of that relationship from his daughter.34 However, the
appellate court reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the
father's relationship had an adverse effect on the child, and directed the
juvenile court to award "customary unsupervised weekend, holiday and
summer visitation" to the father.3 5
Kenneth and Elizabeth Davis divorced in 1991 but continued to live
in the same household until 1994. Although they shared household
expenses, Kenneth did not pay child support as required by the divorce
decree. After Kenneth moved out of the house, Elizabeth filed a
garnishment for unpaid support.38

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 221, 466 S.E.2d at 587.
Id.
Thedieck v. Thedieck, 220 Ga. App. 764, 767, 470 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1996).
221 Ga. App. 338, 471 S.E.2d 284 (1996).
Id. at 339, 471 S.E.2d at 286 (citing Unif. Super. Ct. Rule 24.5(B) (1996)).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-13-1 to -34 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
221 Ga. App. at 339, 471 S.E.2d at 286.
220 Ga. App. 861, 471 S.E.2d 6 (1996).
Id. at 862, 471 S.E.2d at 8.
Id. at 864, 471 S.E.2d at 9.
Davis v. Davis, 220 Ga. App. 745, 470 S.E.2d 268, 269 (1996).
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The state court dismissed Kenneth's traverse seeking credit for shared
expenses.37 The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the
state court neither had the authority to modify the divorce judgment nor
equity jurisdiction to give credit for shared expenses."
The Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 7-4-12
mandates that all judgments bear interest "upon the principal amount
recovered."' This provision was properly applied to a 1989 divorce
decree awarding the former wife "'a sum estimated to be $40,000 for her
share of the equity in the homeplace of the parties.' 4 ° However, the
Georgia Supreme Court ruled that interest accrued only from the date
that "the principal amount recovered" was ascertained. In the case at
bar, that date was in 1994."l
IV.

ALIMONY

Notwithstanding the heated dissent of Justice Hunstein, the majority
of the supreme court in Quillen v. Quillen upheld a provision in a
divorce settlement agreement which obligated the appellee to pay
monthly alimony until the appellant cohabited as defined by Georgia
law.42 Justice Carley, writing for the court, reaffirmed the right of
parties to contract "on any terms regarding subject matter in which they
have an interest,"4 3 and relied extensively on the 1995 decision in Kent
v. Kent.44
As the dissent clarifies, Kent was a modification action, whereas
Quillen arose on a motion for contempt brought by the alimony obligee,
appellant.4" Accordingly, the majority affirmance of the trial court's
finding that appellee was not in contempt, and that his alimony
obligation was terminated by appellant's cohabitation, sidesteps the
constitutional venue requirements and procedural protections of a
modification proceeding.46

37. Id. at 745, 470 S.E.2d at 269.
38. Id. at 746, 470 S.E.2d at 269.
39. O.C.G.A. § 7-4.12 (1991).
40. Brown v. Brown, 265 Ga. 725, 462 S.E.2d 609 (1995).
41. Id. at 727, 462 S.E.2d at 611. The trial court ascertained the former wife's exact
share in a declaratory judgment action filed in 1990 but not decided until 1994. Id. at 726,
462 S.E.2d at 610.
42. 265 Ga. 779, 462 S.E.2d 750 (1995).
43. Id. at 779, 462 S.E.2d at 751.
44. 265 Ga. 211, 452 S.E.2d 764 (1995).
45. Quillen, 265 Ga. at 781-82, 462 S.E.2d at 752-53 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
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In Ragland v. Ragland,47 the supreme court affirmed a jury verdict
ordering each spouse to pay the other one-half of their retirement
benefits upon retirement and directing both to choose the fifty percent
survivor option available under their retirement system. The former
husband appealed. The court held the obligation to be for alimony
because the period of payment into the plan is indefinite, bounded by the
former husband's death or retirement."
The alimony obligation was not illegal, although it required payments
after the husband's death, because "the award in this case will not
impose any duty on his estate after his death."' Rather, the court
likened the obligations to the annuity contract upheld in Andrews v.
Whitaker.5"
V. DIVORCE-SERVICE OF PROCESS

Mr. Southworth sued his wife for separate maintenance. She
answered and counterclaimed for separate maintenance. Thereafter, the
wife's counsel withdrew and the wife moved out of state. The husband
amended his complaint by adding a count seeking divorce. Service of the
amendment was attempted by mail to the wife at the Georgia address
listed in her former counsel's motion to withdraw. The wife did not
answer the amendment nor appear at trial. The divorce decree awarded
the husband all of the marital property, custody of the children, and
child support.5 1 Within the same term of court, the wife moved to set
aside the decree. The trial court granted the motion and the supreme
court affirmed. 2
The supreme court held the "husband's amendment was not a
'pleading subsequent to the original complaint'... within the meaning
of O.C.G.A. section 9-11-5(a)." 3 Rather, the amendment stated an
entirely new cause of action seeking relief which would obviate the
original claim.' Accordingly, in order to meet the wife's constitutional
right to notice, the husband was required to serve her pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 9-11-4." If he knew her address, service should have

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

266 Ga. 643, 469 S.E.2d 658 (1996).
Id. at 643, 469 S.E.2d at 659.
Id.
265 Ga. 76, 453 S.E.2d 735 (1995).
Southworth v. Southworth, 265 Ga. 671, 461 S.E.2d 215 (1995).
Id. at 674-75, 461 S.E.2d at 218.
Id. at 674, 461 S.E.2d at 218 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-5(a) (1993)).
Id.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4 (1993)).
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been attempted in accordance with O.C.G.A. section 9-11-4(e)(2)."6
Otherwise, he should have attempted service by publication. 7
VI.

LEGISLATION

The General Assembly has prohibited marriages between persons of
the same sex,5" and common law marriages entered on or after January
1, 1997 are also forbidden,"
Grandparent visitation rights were restored in other legislation.'
However, the trial court must specifically find "the health or welfare of
the child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted" and that
"the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation."6 1
There is no presumption in favor of grandparent visitation.62
O.C.G.A. section 19-5-12 enacts a new form for final judgments of63
divorce specifying findings required by the child support guidelines.
Moreover, the General Assembly enacted a host of provisions limiting or64
denying various licenses for non-compliance with child support orders.
Included in the list are driver's licenses.65
In another change, O.C.G.A. section 19-3-33.1 now permits a spouse
to use a surname from a previous marriage alone or in conjunction with
the surname of the other spouse.86

56. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(eX2) (1993)).
57. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(e)(1) (1993)).
58. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1996).
59. Id. § 19-3-1.1.
60. Id. § 19-7-3 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
61. Id. § 19-7-3(c).
62. Id
63. Id. § 19-5-12 (1996); see also § 19-6-15 (1996).
64. O.C.G.A. § 2-7-102 (1996) (pesticide); O.C.G.A. § 7-1-1017 (1996) (mortgage lenders
and brokers); O.C.G.A. § 19-6-28.1 (1996) (driver's, trade, business or profession); O.C.G.A.
§ 12-6-49.1 (1996) (forestry); O.C.G.A. § 26-4-78 (1996) (pharmacy); O.C.G.A. §§ 33-23-21,
33-23-22 (1996) (insurance agents); O.C.G.A. § 40-5-54.1 (1996) (driver's); O.C.G.A. § 4339A-14 (1996) (real estate appraisers); OC.G.A. § 43-40-15 (1996) (real estate).
65. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-54.1 (1996).
66. Id. § 19-3-33.1 (1991 & Supp. 1996).

